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Cast of Characters
Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Branch- provides investment banking to clients through three
regionally focused divisions: Swiss Universal Bank, and International Wealth Management and
Asia Pacific.
Daniel Griesemer- Mr. Griesemer has been Chief Executive Officer and President at The
Gymboree Corporation since May 22, 2017. Mr. Griesemer serves as an Executive Director at
GYMBOREE HOLDING Corp. Mr. Griesemer is an agile and experienced retail executive with
an established track record of building customer loyalty in an omni-channel environment.
Elizabeth Schumacher- Ms. Elizabeth Schumacher, also known as Betsy, has been Executive
Vice President and General Manager of Gymboree & Gymboree Outlet at The Gymboree
Corporation since April 29, 2015. Ms. Schumacher joined The Gymboree Corporation in April
2015.
James A. Mesterharm- Mr. Mesterharm, who is the Managing Director at AlixPartners LLP,
was the Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree Corporation beginning June 11, 2017. Mr.
Mesterharm has been the Managing Director at AlixPartners, LLC since 2001. Mr. Mesterharm
specializes in developing financial and operating strategies for underperforming and troubled
companies. He has significant expertise in interim crisis management, cost reduction Plan
development and implementation, cash management, capital structure refinancing and business
Plan development for acquisition and restructuring purposes.
Joan Barnes- Ms. Barnes is the founder of Gymboree Corporation. Barnes’s wish to open an
exercise facility for parents and their toddlers came from her stemmed from her desire to share
playtime and physical fitness with her own baby girl. She opened the first Gymboree recreation
and exercise outlet in 1976.
Judy Robbins- Ms. Robbins was the United States Trustee for the Eastern District of Virginia
during Gymboree’s Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
Liyuan Woo- Ms. Liyuan Woo has been the Interim Chief Financial Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation since June 11, 2017.
LF Centennial Pte. Ltd. (“Li & Fung”)- is a global supply chain manager primarily for US and
EU brands, department stores, hypermarkets, specialty stores, catalogue-led companies, and
ecommerce sites, hired to serve as an intermediary between the Debtors and foreign vendors.

4

Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (“Lazard”)- investment banker hired in January 2017 to assist the
Debtors in analyzing their capital structure and potential sources of liquidity and runaway to
facilitate the operational changes necessary to reduce the operational costs associated with their
“brick and mortar” footprint, including various restructuring and recapitalization options.
Michael A. Condyles- Mr. Condyles, with Kutak Rock LLP, was the lead attorney representing
the Debtors in their bankruptcy and restructuring process.
Robert Jacob-Assisted Joan Barnes in establishing Gymboree as a franchise.
Subsidiaries Party to Restructuring- Gym-Card, LLC; Gym-Market, Inc.; Gymboree
Manufacturing, Inc.; Gymboree Operations, Inc.; Gymboree Retail Stores, Inc.; and S.C.C.
Wholesale, Inc.
The Gymboree Corporation (“the Corporation”) - the parent company of each of the
subsidiaries. The Corporation is a specialty retailer, operating stores with high-quality clothes
and accessories for children. Its brands include Gymboree, Janie and Jack, and Crazy 8. Founded
in 1976, the Corporation went from offering parent-child classes in the San Francisco Bay Area
to currently operating over 900 retail stores in the United States and Canada, along with
franchises around the world.
The Honorable Keith L. Phillips- Judge Keith L. Phillips was the bankruptcy judge in the
Eastern District of Virginia who presided over the Gymboree Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“OCC”) - the United States Trustee appointed 7 creditors to
serve on the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Committee was comprised of
Hansoll Textile, GGP L.P., PREIT Services LLC, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,
Simon Property Group Inc., Hutchin Hill Capital Primary Fund Ltd, and Li & Fung Centennial
Pte Ltd. The Committee was instrumental in the successful reorganization of The Gymboree
Corporation and its affiliates.
ZEAVION Holding- founded by Jack Shi, is a Singapore-based company with a focus on
business development and investment in the education and entertainment sectors. The privatelyheld company bought Gymboree Play & Music and its central operations and centers in North
America.
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Introduction
The Gymboree Corporation (“Gymboree”) —a subsidiary of Giraffe Holding— is a
California based retailer that designs and manufactures high quality children’s apparel across
North America.1 In 2015, Gymboree operated a total of 1,322 retail stores, including 607
Gymboree stores, 170 Gymboree Outlet stores, 150 Janie and Jack shops and 395 Crazy 8 stores,
as well as their respective online stores.2 The map below pinpoints the Debtors’ domestic and
Canadian stores.3

Gymboree also offered programs facilitating parent-child development at 698 franchised
and Company-operated Gymboree Play & Music centers in the United States, and over 40 other
countries. In 2016, Gymboree sold Gymboree Play & Music for 127.5 million dollars, and
thereafter focused solely on retail. Gymboree’s sale of Gymboree Play & Music is discussed in
Section II of this paper.4
On June 11, 2017 (“Petition Date”), Gymboree and its seven affiliates (collectively, the
“Debtors”) each filed a voluntary petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
1

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, Case 17-32986, Doc. No.
30, p. 14. This section of the paper relies heavily upon Mr. Mesterharm’s knowledge of the
Debtors’ history, operations, financial affairs, and restructuring initiatives as the Chief
Restructuring Officer for the Gymboree Corporation.
2

Id. at 6.

3

Id. at 19.

4

See infra Section II.
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District of Virginia declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcy.5 The cases would later be administratively
consolidated for convenience.6 The 2017 Chapter 11 filing was the result of the Debtors’ struggle
to manage 1.1 billion dollars of debt.7 With the newly established Plan, Gymboree and its
affiliated Debtors hoped to eliminate 1 billion dollars in indebtedness.8 This paper explores
Gymboree’s establishment and corporate ownership history and seeks to outline the steps
Gymboree took to achieve a successful reorganization of the company. We hope to demonstrate
how essential pre-bankruptcy negotiations are in ensuring a speedy and successful reorganization
process.9 First, however, we are going to dive into Gymboree’s history and its beginnings.
I.

Background: The Origins of Gymboree

In 1976, Joan Barnes founded the first Gymboree, initially called Kindergym, at a Jewish
community center in San Rafael, California.10 Prior to opening the first Gymboree, Barnes taught
modern dance to children in New York City. She then became an administrator at the Jewish
community center.11 Partially inspired by her personal desire to share playtime and physical
fitness with her own baby girl, Barnes took over the secular program at the Jewish center and
convinced the Jewish community center’s board of directors to start what became the pilot
program for what is now known as Gymboree Play & Music.12 Gymboree Play & Music would
be a place that parents and their toddlers could exercise and play together.13
5

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, supra note 1, at 2.

6

Id. at 34.

7

Id. at 19.

8

Id.

In drafting this paper, we relied heavily on previous students’ outstanding works on the
Gymboree Chapter 11 bankruptcy for purposes of formatting our paper and gathering sources as
well as requisite knowledge on the bankruptcy process. See generally JJ. Logan Wilson S.
Ashton Smith, Parka Problems: The 2009 Eddie Bauer Bankruptcy (2017).
9

10

YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDISFcIzt4c (last visited April 28, 2018).

11

YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKFb2WYFOjs (last visited April 28, 2018).

12

Id. In an effort to get the name Kindergym trademarked with the Department of
Incorporations, the company was faced with difficulty in that the Department found the name to
be “generic.” Thus, the company and its founder renamed the company Gymboree with much
success.
13

See supra note 11.
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With her new adventure, she gained instant success.14 Barnes had no problem filling her
classes, as mothers and fathers lined up to enroll their children.15 After realizing the commercial
potential of her newly found concept, Barnes opened a second center in the late 1970s for parents
with children ranging in ages three months to four years old.16 Barnes’ expertise, however, lay in
creating meaningful moments with parents and their children through physical fitness and
playtime, not creating franchises.17 Thus, Barnes connected with a franchise specialist, Robert
Jacob, who would help her establish a successful Gymboree franchise.18 Barnes’ net worth had
soared well past 1 million dollars by 1985.19
By 1987, Barnes had given birth to ten exercising centers in foreign countries and over
355 centers throughout the United States.20 Combined, those units generated 10 million dollars in
sales annually.21 Gymboree had become very popular among parents and children and eventually
became the foundation for its future success in the retail industry.22 Backed by Gymboree’s
accrued goodwill, the founder opened the first few Gymboree retail stores in 1986.23
Accordingly, Gymboree began to successfully design and manufacture unique, high-quality
merchandise for children ages newborn to nine.24
The new stores were comprised of about 40% hard goods and 60% apparel that attracted
buyers in middle-class markets.25 Initially, Gymboree was successful because it was able to
14

Id.

15

Gymboree Corporation History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, https://perma.cc/EUY7-64SZ.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

FUNDINGUNIVERSE, supra note 15 https://perma.cc/EUY7-64SZ.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.
9

sustain its unique image and increase its profits by self-manufacturing its products.26 Again, the
business soared as sales reached approximately 10 million dollars with 32 retail stores
throughout various shopping malls combined with the 350 Gymboree centers throughout the
United States.27 In 1989, however, the company reported a net loss of approximately 1 million
dollars.28
After a while, it had become evident that the success of the Gymboree’s fitness centers
were declining while the retail stores were booming.29 Barnes’ influence in operations eventually
dwindled as her investment partner, U.S. Venture Partners, was convinced that Gymboree was
failing to reach its full potential.30 Just as Gymboree’s stresses and successes “ebbed and
flowed,” so too did Barnes’ health and marriage.31 Barnes suffered from a stress-induced eating
disorder and failing marriage.32 “When things were going well, the eating disorder receded, but
when things got really stressful and the pressure grew, it became front and forward,” which is
why Barnes decided to call it quits.33 By 1990, Joan Barnes was admitted into a long-term
treatment center where she spent several years on a journey to recovery.34
New management took over the company after Barnes’ departure and made several
necessary changes to ensure Gymboree’s success, and in 1993 Gymboree went public.35

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Joan Barnes & Michael Coffino, Play It Forward: From Gymboree to the Yoga Mat and
Beyond (2016).
32

Journey, JOAN BARNES SPEAKS, (April 29, 2018, 9:35 PM), https://perma.cc/QNM4-TVHS.

33

Gymboree Founder Joan Barnes Shares Her Journey from Young Mom to Mogul, EXTRA,
(April 29, 2018, 9:35 PM), https://perma.cc/RFR2-8EAD.
34

LADIES WHO LAUNCH, (April 29, 2018, 9:35 PM), https://perma.cc/32CU-34YB.

35

FUNDINGUNIVERSE, supra note 15, https://perma.cc/EUY7-64SZ.
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Throughout the late 1990s, Gymboree’s earnings and profits were constantly rising and falling,
which led to high turnover rates among corporate executives.36 It became apparent that there
needed to be some corporate restructuring.37 So, in 1998 Gymboree added four new senior
management positions: chief information officer, senior vice-president in sourcing and logistics,
vice-president logistics, and managing directorship.38 This proved to be a success; sales figures
showed a 20% increase in sales after implementing the new management personnel.39 That
summer, Gymboree also relocated its sole distribution center to Dixon, California.40

II.

The Debtors’ Business

A. Brand Offerings

Gymboree was launched in 1986.41 Gymboree was designed for kids, age 0 to 14, with
products priced between $15 to $45.42 The brand is offered both nationally and internationally
across 586 stores, 174 outlets, and 48 franchised stores.43 In 2016, Gymboree accounted for
approximately 61% of the Debtors’ revenue. Gymboree’s competitors include Macy’s, The Gap,
Children’s Place, Carters, and TJ Maxx.44
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 9.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

11

As an affiliate of Gymboree, Janie and Jack launched its line in 2002.45 Janie and Jack
provided consumers with dressy to dressed-up casual attire for children with a distinct quality,
design, and detail.46 This timeless, dressy casual collection is sold in boutique-like outlets.47 As
the Debtors’ highest-end brand offering, Janie and Jack designs are priced between $24 to
$250.48 Its operation includes 104 stores, 45 outlets, and two franchise stores.49 The brand
accounted for 17% of the Debtors’ revenue in 2016.50 Janie and Jack is most comparable to other
high-end retailers, such as Nordstrom, Ralph Lauren, and J. Crew, targeting families with a
median household income of $125,000.51 To complement the quality and design of their clothes
and accessories, Janie and Jack offers individualized customer service by providing suggestions
regarding the apparel options that best suit each customer’s need.52 Customers also have the
option of purchasing Janie and Jack merchandise online.53

45

Id. at 10.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

JANIE AND JACK, https://perma.cc/4VCK-U2KA (last visited April 29, 2018).
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As the newest addition to the Gymboree family, Crazy 8 launched its brand in 2007.54
Crazy 8 provides apparel priced 20%-30% less than the Gymboree line.55 The brand consists of
very versatile fashion for the value-oriented consumers.56 Apparel prices at Crazy 8 ranges from
$2 to $25.57 The bright colors and bold patterns invite kids to be bold and be themselves.58
Families consisting of three or more children with an household income of $75,000 typically
shop at Crazy 8, as they value a more practical approach to shopping.59 The three brands are
offered across the United States and Canada.60 In 2015, Gymboree operated a total of 1,322 retail
stores, including 607 Gymboree stores, 170 Gymboree Outlet stores, 150 Janie and Jack stores
and 395 Crazy 8 stores.61

54

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, Case 17-32986, Doc. No.
30, p. 11.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

CRAZY 8, https://perma.cc/75ZD-3EUU (last visited April 29, 2018).

59

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, supra note 54, at 11.

60

Id.

61

Id.
13

B. Supply Chain

While the Debtors maintained control over their brands by designing and merchandising
in-house, the Debtors utilized international sourcing and production protocol that relied heavily
on foreign suppliers.62 “Substantially, all of the Debtors’ retail products [were] manufactured
overseas, where the Debtors work[ed] with a diverse set of suppliers comprised of over 100
vendors and 166 factories to manufacture apparel in accordance with their specifications.”63
Most of the suppliers were located in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India, and the
transactions between the Debtors and foreign suppliers did not consist of long term contracts.
Approximately 93% of the Debtors’ foreign products were sourced through LF
Centennial Pte. Ltd. (“Li & Fung”). Li & Fung served as a liaison between the Debtors and
foreign vendors. Specifically, Li & Fung helped the Debtors negotiate prices and purchase orders
and communicated with foreign vendors to ensure timely production and compliance with
foreign laws and regulations. By utilizing Li & Fung as an intermediary, the Debtors were able to
reduce the cost of production by 6%. “The Debtors routinely evaluated new vendors within the
Li & Fung network to ensure competitive pricing and [had] significantly shifted their sourcing
portfolio since 2011 to vertically-integrated factories…”64
Overseas manufacturers manufactured and shipped inventory to the Debtors’ Freight on
Board (“FOB”). Under FOB,65 the Debtors’ paid freight forwarders to transport merchandise
from foreign manufacturers to the United States. The inventory was shipped to the Debtors’
warehouse in Dixon, California.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Under FOB, title is transferred to the Debtors at the foreign port when merchandise and goods
are loaded for shipment to the United States.
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In 2016, the Debtors began selling their Gymboree and Crazy 8 inventory in bulk
quantities (i.e. wholesaling) to larger merchants, such as T.J. Maxx and Amazon.66 The Debtors
greatly benefited from wholesaling in this manner because they were able to establish a broader
customer base, gaining consumers who would not normally shop at Crazy 8 or Gymboree.67
Platforms such as Amazon and T.J. Maxx also allowed the Debtors to profit from the geographic
markets where the wholesaler served as a “one-stop-shop” for all of the consumers’ needs.68 For
inventory purposes, the Debtors elected to maintain a single distribution center located in Dixon,
California. 69 The merchandise and other inventory were shipped from the Dixon facility to the
physical retail sites and to the customers to fulfill online orders.70
III.

Prepetition Transactions

A. Gymboree Goes Private (Merger Agreement)
On October 11, 2010, Gymboree entered an agreement and plan of merger (the “Merger
Agreement”) with Giraffe Holding, Inc. (the “Parent”), a Delaware corporation and Giraffe
Acquisition Corporation (“Acquisition Sub”).71 Acquisition Sub is a Delaware corporation that
operates as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Parent. As consideration for the merger,
Acquisition Sub offered to acquire all of Gymboree’s outstanding shares at a price of $65.40 per
share or 1.76 billion dollars. On November 23, 2010, Acquisition Sub and Gymboree merged
pursuant to the Merger Agreement, with Gymboree continuing as the surviving entity and a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Parent.
B. Gymboree Sells Gymboree Play & Music
On July 15, 2016, Gymboree sold Gymboree Play & Music for 127.5 million dollars in
cash, netting approximately 80 million dollars after taxes, to ZEAVION Holding, a privately66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. On May 5, 2015, Gymboree sold its distribution center in Dixon, California for net
proceeds of 25.9 million, and entered into a leaseback of the property from the purchaser for a
period of 15 years. Approximately $10.9 million of the proceeds from the sale were restricted to
fund capital expenditures or reduce Gymboree’s liability under the Term Loan Facility.
70

Id.

71

Id.
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held company focusing on education.72 ZEAVION now owns the Gymboree Play & Music
business, including the central operations and centers in North America.73 ZEAVION also
acquired the intellectual property of Gymboree Play & Music’s curriculum and certain related
trademarks. 74 As such, Gymboree Play & Music is now a standalone, privately-held company.75
Gymboree’s global apparel business and related retail brands were excluded from the
transaction.76 Today, Gymboree remains a big player in the children’s clothing market,
competing with stores such as The Children’s Place and the Gap.77
IV.

Events Leading to Chapter 11 Filing

A. Challenging Operating Environment
Unfortunately, the Debtors, along with many other retailers were victims of society’s
shift from malls and shopping centers to online shopping. As consumers increasingly shopped
online, retail companies, such as Gymboree, lost a large number of customers. Additionally, the
Debtors struggled to keep up with their competitors, “such as Children’s Place and the Gap, who
[had] less leveraged capital structures.”78 This meant their competitors were able to offer their
customers lower prices than Gymboree.
These issues, along with the Debtors’ poor online presence, caused a decline in the
Debtors’ sales and operations. In 2016, the Debtors’ experienced a 24% decline (from 94 million
72

Amended Disclosure Statement Disclosure Statement for the First Amended Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization of the Gymboree Corporation and Its Debtor Affiliates, Case 17-32986,
Doc. No. 449, p. 31. Approximately $109 million from the sale was restricted for purposes of
paying down outstanding obligations under the term loan credit agreement and capital
expenditures. Gymboree has used the proceeds of the sale to delever its balance sheet, invest in
its online offerings, store network, and supply chain infrastructure. As of the Petition Date,
the remaining balance of the restricted cash attributable to the Play & Music Transaction was
approximately $13.6 million.
73

Gymboree Agrees to Sell Play & Music Business To ZEAVION, CISION PR NEWSWIRE, (April
29, 2018, 9:35 PM), https://perma.cc/87hv-px4y.
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Gymboree Corporation History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, https://perma.cc/EUY7-64SZ.

78

Id. at 19.
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dollars in 2015 to 71 million dollars in 2016) in their earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization.79
B. Supply Chain Challenges
As previously mentioned, foreign vendors were crucial to the Debtors’ ongoing business
operations. Specifically, the Debtors’ depended on the uninterrupted flow of inventory through
their supply chain.80 Historically, the Debtors enjoyed short term favorable trade terms with
foreign vendors, including payment terms that allowed the Debtors to pay for shipments as many
as 75 days from the date of shipment.81 However, in January 2017 the foreign vendors were
reluctant to continue to offer such terms after media coverage revealed Gymboree’s leadership
changes and looming debt overhang.82
Foreign vendors demanded revised trade terms including prepayments, cash on delivery,
and a discontinuation of credit extensions.83 “This shift in payment terms both strained the
Debtors’ liquidity and put the delivery of the Debtors’ winter 2017 purchase orders at material
risk, jeopardizing the Debtors’ ability to fully capitalize on customer demand during the peak
holiday selling season.”84
In light of the contractual changes, on April 21, 2017, Gymboree entered into an
agreement with Li & Fung.85 The agreement provided that Gymboree would (1) provide a 10
million dollar standby letter of credit and (2) issue a 20 million dollar incremental term loan to Li
& Fung.86 In turn, Li & Fung agreed to extend credit to Gymboree in purchases from vendors in
79

Id. at 5.

80

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, Case 17-32986, Doc. No.
30, p. 23.
81

Id.

82

Id.

Id. As is typical in the apparel industry, the Debtors’ inventory represents a substantial portion
of the ABL Facility borrowing base. Thus, delay in vendors’ shipments of new inventory to the
Debtors limits the Debtors’ ability to borrow under the ABL Facility which, in a vicious cycle,
further limits the Debtors’ ability to secure fresh inventory.
83

84

Id. at 23.

85

Id. at 24.

86

Id.
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Bangladesh with respect to the Debtors’ current and future purchase orders and actively promote
and support positive messages to foreign vendors.87
C. Prepetition Waiver/Amendment
To add to the list of financial issues leading up to the Chapter 11 filing, Gymboree also
defaulted on their Asset-Based Loan (“ABL”).88 On May 12, 2017, ABL agents and lenders
received notice that the Debtors’ failed to maintain a combined account availability of 17.5
million dollars and 10% of the term loan borrowing, pursuant to the ABL credit agreement.89
While the Debtors’ were technically in default under this covenant, the ABL agents decided to
waive the default and allow the Debtors’ to remain in compliance with the agreement.90 In
return, the Debtors agreed to provide weekly status calls regarding their financials, provide
weekly borrowing base certificates, and cooperate with the ABL agents.91
D. Management Changes
Gymboree also experienced two major management changes. In March 2017,
Gymboree’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Mark Breitbard, announced his resignation.92 The
position was temporarily filled by Mark Weiker, a long-time director.93 Going forward,
Gymboree initiated a nationwide search for a permanent CEO. On May 22, 2017, the Debtors
appointed Daniel J. Griesemer as CEO.94
In May 2017, a month before the Debtors filed for bankruptcy, the Chief Financial
Officer (“CFO”), also announced his resignation, effective immediately.95 He contended that his

87

Id.

88

Id. at 25.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 26.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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decision was solely based on personal issues.96 The Debtors appointed Liyuan Woo as temporary
CFO until the Debtors could find someone to fill the position permanently.97
E. Exploration of Strategic Alternatives
Faced with the financial difficulties outlined above, the Debtors realized the need to
explore restructuring alternatives. In January 2017, the Debtors retained a legal advisor and
investment banker.98 The Debtors, in March 2017, also hired a restructuring and financial
advisor.99 “Together, the Debtors and their advisors analyzed the Debtors’ capital structure and
potential sources of liquidity and runway to facilitate operational changes necessary to reduce the
burdensome operational costs associated with their brick and mortar footprint, including various
restructuring and recapitalization options.”100
By exploring restructuring alternatives, the Debtors commenced a detailed review of their
real estate portfolio in an effort to locate their underperforming retail stores.101 The Debtors,
along with their team of hired professionals, decided it best that the Debtors renegotiate and
restructure their current real estate leases.102 “As part of the restructuring, the Debtors planned to
exit or renegotiate leases across their portfolio.”103

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 26. The Debtors retained Kirkland and Ellis LLP, as a legal advisor, and Lazard Freres &
Co, LLC as investment banker.
99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 27.

102

Id.

103

Id.
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V.

Prepetition Capital Structure

By the Petition Date, the Debtors had accrued approximately 1.1 billion in total funded
debt obligations.104 The Debtors’ prepetition debt obligations consisted of 81 million dollars
under the senior secured asset-based revolving credit facility ( the “ABL Revolver”); 47.5
million dollars outstanding under Gymboree’s asset-based term loan (the “ABL Term Loan”)
and, together with the ABL Revolver (the “ABL Facility”); 788.8 million dollars in aggregate
principal amount outstanding under the Debtors’ senior secured term loan (the “Term Loan
Facility”); and 171 million dollars in aggregate principal amount of 9.125% unsecured senior
notes due 2018 (the “Unsecured Notes”).105
The following chart depicts the Debtors’ prepetition capital structure:106

A. ABL Facility
On March 30, 2012, the Gymboree Corporation, as lead borrower, entered into an ABL
Credit Agreement (the “ABL Agreement”) that had been amended and restated from time to
time.107 The ABL Agreement provided for a senior secured revolving credit facility, consisting
of 225 million dollars and a senior secured term loan consisting of 50 million dollars, subject to a
104

Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, Case 17-32986, Doc. No.
30, p. 19.
105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.
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171.2 million dollar borrowing base.108 The Debtors’ obligations under the ABL Facility were
secured, subject to certain exceptions, by a first priority lien on the Debtors’ assets, including the
Debtors’ accounts receivable, inventory, cash and cash equivalents.109 The ABL Facility was
also secured by a second priority lien on the Debtors’ capital stock and other personal property,
including, without limitations, the Debtors’ intellectual property and investment contracts.110
Immediately before filing the petition establishing this Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding, the
Debtors had 81 million dollars in borrowings and approximately 49.3 million dollars in letters of
credit outstanding under the ABL Revolver Facility. 111 In addition, the Debtors had 47.5 million
dollars outstanding under the ABL Term Loan.112
B. Term Loan
On February 11, 2011, the Gymboree Corporation, as the borrower, entered into another
credit agreement (the “Term Loan Credit Agreement”) with the other Debtor guarantors, Credit
Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch, as administrative and collateral agent (the “Term Loan
Agent”), and the lender parties (the “Term Loan Lenders”).113 The final payment date for the
Term Loan Facility was February 2018.114 The Debtors’ obligations under the Term Loan
Facility were secured, “subject to certain exceptions, by a first priority lien on the Debtors’
capital stock, intellectual property, and investment contracts and a second priority lien on all of
the Debtors’ other personal property, including accounts receivable, inventory, cash and cash
equivalents.”115 At the time of the petition filing, the Debtors had approximately 790 million
dollars in aggregate principal outstanding under the Term Loan.116
Id. at 20. The Debtors’ borrowing base was configured using an accounting metric used by
financial institutions to estimate the available collateral on the Debtors’ assets in order to
determine the Debtors’ credit limit. Essentially, the borrowing base is the Debtors’ effective
maximum availability.
108

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.
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Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 21.
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C. Unsecured Notes
In connection with the Acquisition discussed in Section III, Gymboree issued 400 million
dollars aggregate principal amount of 9.125% Unsecured Notes under an indenture on November
23, 2010.117 At the time of the petition filing, the Debtor had approximately 171 million dollars
in aggregate principal amount of Unsecured Notes outstanding.118 Since 2012, Gymboree had
repurchased “Unsecured Notes with an aggregate total principal amount of 229 million dollars
for approximately 113.5 million dollars in cash through privately negotiated transaction, open
market transactions, and cash tender offer.”119 The Unsecured Notes were due in December 2018
and required semiannual coupon payments on June 1 and December 1.120 The Debtors failed to
make the June 1, 2017 coupon payment.121
VI.

Restructuring Support Agreement

The Debtors, in an effort to protect the value in its business, reached an agreement with
approximately 66%122 of lenders holding Gymboree’s 788.8 million dollar secured term loan to
fund and support an expedited restructuring that would ensure a viable enterprise and maximize
stakeholder recoveries (“Restructuring Agreement”).123 The terms of the Restructuring
Agreement included a $1 billion debt reduction and a 105 million dollar debtor-in-possession
financing facility (“DIP Term Loan Financing”) consisting of (a) up to 35 million dollars in new
money delayed draw term loans”) to fund the Chapter 11 Cases and (b) 70 million dollars of
term loans to refinance the amounts that were due and owed under the Term Loan Credit
Agreement. Under this agreement, certain Consenting Creditors124 agreed to fund up to 80
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Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Exclusive of the 20 million dollar Li & Fung Term Loan, as described and defined in Section

III.
123

Id. at 27.

124

The Consenting Creditors consisted of each Term Loan Lender that was a party to the
Restructuring Support Agreement.
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million dollars in two new money rights offerings (the “Rights Offerings”)125 in connection with
the other restructuring transactions.
On June 11, 2017, with the pre-negotiated Restructuring Agreement in hand, the Debtors
filed voluntary petitions that were jointly administered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcy.126 The petition filing operated
as an automatic stay to prohibit their creditors from seeking to liquidate the assets in which they
held a secured interest.127 The Honorable Keith L. Phillips presided over the case.
VII.

First Day Motions

In addition to filing the bankruptcy petition, the Debtors filed 27 “first day motions”
divided into the three categories provided in Bankruptcy Practice: (i) orders facilitating the
administration of the estate, (ii) orders smoothing the day-to-day operations, and (iii) orders
authorizing debtors to honor prepetition obligations.128 Ten of those motions consisted of pro hac
vice requests, which were all granted by the Court. This section of the paper will capture the
most important motions in detail.
A. Orders Facilitating Administration of the Estate
1. Joint Administration of the Estates
Under Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b), a Court may order joint administration of the estates if
there are two or more petitions pending by a debtor and an affiliate.129 Immediately after the
Petition was filed, the Debtors filed a motion for joint administration of their Chapter 11 cases.130
The Court granted the Debtors’ motion to allow Gymboree and its affiliates to file joint motions
and other documents under Gymboree Corporation, thereby providing a more convenient and
cost effective bankruptcy process.131
125

Id.

126

In re Gymboree Corp., Case No. 17-32986-KLP, Bankr. Virg., Voluntary Petition (Dkt. 1)
(June 11, 2017).
127

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).

128

BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE (5TH. ED.) 273－75.

129

11 U.S.C. § 1015.

130

Motion for Joint Administration, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 3.

131

Hearing held; Motion for Joint Administration GRANTED, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 53.
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2. Official Claims and Noticing Agent
Gymboree also requested that the Court allow them to employ Prime Clerk, LLC (“Prime
Clerk”) as the official claims and noticing agent.132 This was to be expected, because 28 U.S.C. §
156(c) empowers the Court to allow debtors to retain their own agents.133 By appointing Prime
Clerk as the noticing agent, the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia would be relieved from the burden associated with notifying an extremely
large body of creditors.134
In a different, but similar, motion, Gymboree also proposed the means by which creditors
would be notified. Known creditors would be served by first class U.S. mail.135 Gymboree also
requested authorization to compile a shortened mailing list of creditors to whom it would be
required to send notice; others would be required to file a request with the Court to be placed on
the list or they could access the documents electronically through the Prime Clerk website.136
3. Extensions
In an effort to ensure the timely retrieval of hundreds of documents, Gymboree also
requested a thirty day extension to file the Debtors’ schedule of assets and liabilities, schedules
of current income and expenditures, schedules of executory contracts and unexpired leases, and
statements of financial repairs.137 Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule
1007(c) normally requires schedules and statements to be filed within 14 days of the petition
date.138 Thus, the thirty day extension would allow them a total of 44 days to retrieve those
Debtors’ Motion For Entry Of An Order Approving Prime Clerk LLC as Claims and Noticing
Agent, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 9.
132

28 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012). See also Debtors’ Motion for Entry of An Order Approving Prime
Clerk LLC as Claims and Noticing Agent, supra note 131, at p. 12.
133

134

Id.

Debtors’ Motion For Entry Of An Order Approving The Form And Manner Of Notice Of
Commencement Of The Chapter 11 Case, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 4, p. 3.
135

136

Id.

137

Motion to Approve Debtors' Motion For Entry of an Order (I) Extending Time to File
Schedules and Statements of Financial Affairs, (II) Authorizing the Debtors to File a
Consolidated List of Creditors In Lieu of Submitting a Mailing Matrix for each Debtor, (III)
Authorizing the Debtors to File a Consolidated List of the Debtors 50 Largest Unsecured
Creditors, Case No. 17-32986, Doc. No. 5.
138

Id. at 3.
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documents. In the same motion, Gymboree also requested authorization to filing a consolidated
list of the Debtors’ 50 largest creditors in lieu of submitting a separate mailing matrix for each
Debtor.139 The Court granted their motion.
B. Orders that Smooth Day-to-Day Operations
1. Debtor-in-Possession Financing
One of the Debtors’ biggest concerns was being able to obtain the financing needed to
continue ongoing business operations. When they entered bankruptcy, they had a limited supply
of cash on hand.140 Therefore, the Debtors executed a written agreement with their ABL Lenders
and Consenting Term Lenders ( collectively referred to as “Lenders”), whereby the Lenders
would provide the proposed DIP financing in the form of a postpetition ABL facility (the “DIP
ABL Facility”)141 to create fund availability over the pendency of the case.142 To set the ball in
motion, the Debtors filed a motion for entry of interim and final orders, authorizing the Debtors
to obtain postpetition financing and use cash collateral amongst other authorizations.143 On June
12, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Debtors’ entry into the DIP ABL Facility and the
DIP Term Loan Facility on an interim basis (the “Interim DIP Order”), whereby all prepetition
outstanding amounts under the ABL Facility, including the ABL Term Loan and ABL Revolver,

139

Id. at 6-7.

140

Motion to Approve Debtor in Possession Financing Debtors' Emergency Motion for Entry of
Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (II)
Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (III) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority
Administrative Expense Status, (IV) Granting Adequate Protection to the Prepetition Lenders,
(V) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (VI) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (VII) Granting Related
Relief, Case No. 17-32986, Doc. No. 31, p. 7.
The loans under the ABL Facility are secured by the Debtors’ assets, including inventory,
accounts receivable, equipment, and/or other balance-sheet assets.
141

142

Id.

143

Id. Included in the filing of the DIP financing motion, the Debtors requested that the Court
allow the Debtors to 1) grant liens and provide superpriority administrative expense status, 2)
grant adequate protection to the prepetition lenders, 3) modify the automatic stay, 4) schedule a
final hearing, and 5) grant related relief. All of which were granted by the Court with no
objections from the other parties.
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would be converted into postpetition obligations under the DIP ABL Credit Facility to fund the
administrative costs of these chapter 11 cases.144
The issue, however, was that the Debtors’ budget (“Budget”), which was annexed to the
Interim Order, outlining the Debtors’ anticipated postpetition cash expenditures in the initial 13
weeks of the chapter 11 cases.145 While the Proposed DIP Financing and Budget certainly
benefited the Debtors and most of its stakeholders, it fell ill on the Debtors’ Landlords, classified
as general unsecured creditors. For example, pursuant to the terms of the Proposed DIP
Financing, the secured lenders sought to waive the Debtors’ right to surcharge collateral under
Sections 506(c)146 and 552(b)147 of the Bankruptcy Code and failed to pay or include rent owed

144

Order Granting Motion on Interim Basis I) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition
Financing, (II) Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (III) Granting Liens and
Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (IV) Granting Adequate Protection to
the Prepetition Lenders, (V) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (VI) Scheduling a Final Hearing,
and (VII) Granting Related Relief and Continuing to Final Hearing, Case No. 17-32986, Doc.
No. 86.
Objection Of Certain Landlords To Debtors’ Motion For Entry Of Interim And Final Orders
(I) Authorizing The Debtors To Obtain Postpetition Financing, (Ii) Authorizing The Debtors To
Use Cash Collateral, (Iii) Granting Liens And Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense
Status, (Iv) Granting Adequate Protection To The Prepetition Lenders, (V) Modifying The
Automatic Stay, (Vi) Scheduling A Final Hearing, Case No. 17-32986, Doc. No. 248.
145
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11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2012) (permits a debtor to charge the costs of preserving or disposing of a
secured lender’s collateral to the collateral itself. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). This provision ensures that
the cost of liquidating a secured lender’s collateral is not paid from unsecured recoveries.) See,
e.g., Precision Steel Shearing v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 321, 325
(3d Cir. 1995) (stating, “section 506(c) is designed to prevent a windfall to the secured
creditor”); Kivitz v. CIT Group/Sales Fin., Inc., 272 B.R. 332, 334 (D. Md. 2000) (stating, “the
reason for [section 506(c)] is that unsecured creditors should not be required to bear the cost of
protecting property that is not theirs”).
147

11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (permits a debtor, committee or other party-in-interest to exclude
post-petition proceeds from pre-petition collateral on equitable grounds, including to avoid
having unencumbered assets fund the cost of a secured lender’s foreclosure under the “equities
of the case” exception.).
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to the Landlords for the use of their property148 for the period of June 11, 2017 (the Petition
Date) through June 30, 2017, (“Stub Rent”)149 in its Budget.150
The Landlords, “upon information and belief,” claimed that the Debtors intended to pay
the Stub Rent as an administrative fee.151 However, there were no assurances in the DIP Motion,
the Budget, or the Interim DIP Order that the Debtors’ estate would be adequately funded to pay
all administrative claims.152 The Debtors were operating in a challenging environment and was at
risk of administrative insolvency at confirmation. Therefore, the Landlords filed an objection to
the DIP Motion on July 3, 2017, demanding that the Debtors immediately comply with the
performance obligations mandated under section 365(d)(3)153 of the Bankruptcy Code and pay
the Stub Rent.154
148

The Landlords owned 295 properties that the Debtors occupied.

149

11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (2012). Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant
part, that:
[t]he trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from
and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section
503(b)(1) of this title.
Section 365(d)(3) is a controversial provision that demands debtor-tenants to timely pay rent
postpetition under a nonresidential real property lease prior to rejecting or accepting the lease,
regardless of whether the debtor is actually using the leased property. Therefore, debtors often
contest whether “stub rent” falls within the section 365(d)(3) requirement.
150

See supra 60 at 4.

151

Id. at 5.

“Administrative Claim” means a Claim for costs and expenses of administration of the
Debtors’ Estates pursuant to sections 503(b), 507(a)(2), 507(b), or 1114(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, including the actual and necessary costs and expenses incurred after the Petition Date and
through the Effective Date of preserving the Estates and operating the businesses of the Debtors.
152

153

11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (2012).

154

Objection to (Re: related document(s)31 Motion to Approve Debtor in Possession Financing
filed by The Gymboree Corporation) filed by Joseph D. Wilson of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP
on behalf of DDR Corp., DLC Management Corp., GGP, Inc., Gregory Greenfield & Associates
Ltd., JLL, Regency Centers Corporation, Rouse Properties, Inc., Shopcore Properties, LP,
Turnberry Associates, Vernon Hills Shopping Center LLC, Case No. 17-32986, Doc. No. 248, p.
6.
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On July 11, 2017, however, the Court held a hearing, whereby it granted the Debtors’
DIP Motion for financing.155 The Court stated that the secured prepetition lenders were entitled
to a waiver of any “equities of the case” exception under section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
and the postpetition DIP lenders were entitled to a waiver of the provisions of section 506(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code.156 Prior to the confirmation of the Plan, the Debtors negotiated the setting
aside of $4.5 million pro rata share for the general unsecured creditors, including the Landlords.
It appears that this settlement resolved everything, including that regarding the Stub Rent
Objection.
If the Court had denied the Debtors the financing needed to sustain on-going business
during the critical first weeks of these cases, the Debtors would not have been able to continue
operating for more than two weeks postpetition and would have needed to liquidate soon after, to
the detriment of their stakeholders.157 The Court’s final approval of the DIP Motion meant that
all of the Debtors’ prepetition outstanding amounts under the ABL Facility would be converted
into postpetition obligations under the DIP ABL Credit Facility on a final basis so that the
Debtors could fund the administrative costs of these chapter 11 cases.158
C. Order Authorizing Debtors to Honor Pre-Petition
Obligations

155

Hearing held; Motion GRANTED on Final Basis; (related document(s): 31 Debtor in
Possession Financing Debtors' Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I)
Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (II) Authorizing the Debtors to Use
Cash Collateral, (III) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Status,
(IV) Granting Adequate Protection to the Prepetition Lenders, (V) Modifying the Automatic
Stay, (VI) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (VII) Granting Related Relief, Case No. 17-32986,
Doc. No. 351.
156

Id.
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Declaration of James A. Mesterharm, Chief Restructuring Officer of The Gymboree
Corporation, in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, Case No. 17-32986, Doc.
No. 30
158

See infra Section VII (Debtor-in-Possession Financing) (Although the Court granted the
Debtors’ DIP Motion for financing in the Final Order, the Debtors amended its Plan to extend a
$4.5 million pro rata distribution to its general unsecured creditors, contingent upon the general
unsecured claim holders vote of acceptance.)
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In this category, Gymboree sought Court approval to honor prepetition obligations to
ensure that company could continue to operate in its normal course of business. These motions
included the Debtors’ requests to continue to pay, honor, or authorize wages (along with other
compensation & benefits), existing customer programs, related tax payments and assessments,
cash management systems, and payment for future utilities services. This motion failed to
include stub rent as a prepetition obligation, as the Debtors wished to convert the Stub Rent as an
administrative expense postpetition. Nonetheless, the Court issued final orders granting each of
the Debtors’ requests, allowing the Debtors to fulfill their prepetition obligations so as to
continue in the ordinary course business. The Debtors’ requests in this category of motions are
detailed below.
1. Cash Management System
The Cash Management System was utilized in the company’s ordinary course of business
to transfer and distribute funds and facilitate cash flow monitoring. The bank accounts included
payroll accounts, dental claims, employee reimbursement, a gift card account, and a number of
other important accounts. 11 U.S.C. 363(c)(1) authorizes a debtor in possession to use property
of the estate so long as it is in the ordinary course of business.159
2. Wages, Salaries, and Customer Programs
To prevent the loss of employees, the Debtors requested authorization to continue to
honor both pre-petition and post-petition wages, salaries, and reimbursable expenses.160 In an
effort to attract customers and maintain positive relationships, the Debtors sought authorization
from the Courts to continue customer programs, including but not limited to the acceptance of
non-cash payments.161 The court did not hesitate to authorize the Debtors to honor these
obligations, as they were an essential part of the Debtors’ restructuring.162
3. Utility Services
To continue operating in the ordinary course of business and management of their
properties, the Debtors requested to pay the utility service providers and their affiliates the
amount to be owed at the time of the Petition Date, which totaled $314,680. According to section
366 of the title 11 of the United States Code, the Debtors were shielded from the immediate
159

11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (2012).

160

Motion to Authorize Payment of Wages, Salaries, and Customer Programs, Case 17-32986,
Doc. No. 6.
161

Id.

162

Order Authorizing the Payment of Wages, Salaries, and Customer Programs, Case 17-32986,
Doc. No. 376.
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termination or alteration of utility services after the Petition Date, and were required to provide
“adequate163” assurance of payment for postpetition services within thirty days of the petition, or
the utility company may alter, refuse, or discontinue service.164 The policy underlying section
366 of the Bankruptcy Code is to protect debtors, such as Gymboree and its affiliates, from the
immediate termination of utility service upon filing bankruptcy while simultaneously providing
utility companies adequate assurance that the debtors will pay for postpetition services.165 Thus,
the Court granted the motion, as uninterrupted utility services were essential to the Debtors’
ability to maintain their ongoing business.166
4. Related Taxes and Fees
Also, the Debtors estimated that approximately $13.2 million in taxes and fees (“Taxes
and Fees”) were outstanding as of the Petition Date.167 The Taxes and Fees included property,
income, franchise, sales and use taxes, as well as those taxes and fees required to operate their
franchises in certain states and foreign jurisdictions, including business licensing, annual report
fees, and business and occupation taxes.168 Thus, the Debtors, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule

Although assurance of payment must be “adequate,” it need not constitute an absolute
guarantee of the debtors’ ability to pay.” See In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653, 2009
WL 484553, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2009); see also In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No.
11-cv-1338, 2011 WL 5546954, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011) (finding that “[Courts will
approve an amount that is adequate enough to insure against unreasonable risk of nonpayment,
but are not required to give the equivalent of a guaranty of payment in full’”); In re Caldor, Inc.
—NY, 199 B.R. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Section 366(b) requires … ‘adequate assurance’ of
payment. The statute does not require an ‘absolute guarantee of payment.’”) (citation omitted),
aff’d sub nom. Va. Elec. & Power Co. Caldor, Inc. —NY, 117 F.3d 646 (2d Cir. 1997).
163

164

11 U.S.C. § 366(c)(2) (2012).
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In re Gymboree Corp., Case No. 17-32986-KLP, Bankr. Virg., Voluntary Petition (Dkt. 23);
see also In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653, 2009 WL 484553, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
Jan. 14, 2009) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 95—595, at 350 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6306).
166

Final Order (I) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Future
Utility Services, (II) Prohibiting Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing
Services, (III) Approving the Debtors Proposed Procedures for Resolving Additional Assurance
Requests, and (IV) Granting Related Relief, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 378.
167

In re Gymboree Corp., Case No. 17-32986-KLP, Bankr. Virg., Voluntary Petition (Dkt. 22)
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Id.
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6003,169 requested that the Court authorize, but not direct, the Debtors to remit and pay Taxes
and Fees that accrued prior to the Petition Date to avoid irreparable harm.170
The Taxes and Fees are summarized as follows171:
Category

Description

Approximate Amount
accrued as of Petition
Date

Sales and Use Taxes

Taxes imposed on the sale and
purchase of certain goods and services

Income Taxes

Taxes imposed on the Debtors’ income
in the ordinary course of operating their
businesses

Franchise Taxes

Taxes required to conduct business in
the ordinary course

Property Taxes

Approximate Amount
Due During Interim
Period

$5,800,000

$4,400,000

$900,000

$815,000

Taxes and obligations related to real
and personal property holdings

$2,600,000

$220,000

Miscellaneous Taxes and Fees

The Debtors remit other taxes and fees
required to operate their business in
certain states, including business and
occupation taxes and commercial
activity taxes

$1,300,000

$289,000

Audits

Investigations by the Authorities (as
defined herein), with respect to the
above categories, which may result in
the imposition of Assessments together
with interest and possible fines and
penalties to become payable

$2,600,000

$0

Total

$13,200,000.00

5,724,000.00

169

18 U.S. Code § 6003 (empowering the Court to grant relief within the first 21 days after the
Petition Date “to the extent that relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm”).
170

Motion to Authorize Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Approving the
Debtors Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Future Utility Services, (II) Prohibiting
Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing Services, (III) Approving the
Debtors Proposed Procedures for Resolving Additional Assurance Requests, and (IV) Granting
Related Relief, Case No. 17-32986, Doc. No. 23.
171

Id.

31

Failure to pay such Taxes and Fees could have materially disrupted the Debtors’ business
operations.172 For example, the taxing and licensing authorities (“Authorities”) could have
audited the Debtors, which may have interrupted or halted the Debtors’ progression in the
restructuring process; the Authorities could have attempted to suspend the Debtors’ operations,
file liens, or seek to lift the automatic stay; and certain Debtors’ directors and officers could have
been subject to personal liability claims.173 On July 11, 2017, the Court issued a final order,
authorizing, but not directing, the Debtors to remit and pay prepetition Taxes and Fees in the
ordinary course of business.174
5. Lien Claimants, Import and Export Claimants, & 503(B)(9)
Claimants
The Debtors generally designed their own merchandise in-house and contracted with
various foreign manufacturers, located primarily in Asia, to produce and manufacture the predesigned merchandise in accordance with the Debtors’ design specifications.175 To maintain an
uninterrupted flow of inventory and other goods through its supply and distribution network,
such as the purchase, importation, storage, and shipment of its merchandise, the Debtors
requested that the Court authorize the Debtors to pay the prepetition and postpetition amounts
owed to warehousemen, shippers, and other non-merchant lienholders.176 If the Court denied
such a request, the claimants could have asserted liens on and/or refused to deliver or release the
goods in their possession to secure payments and fees owed by the Debtors.177
The Debtors also requested to pay import and export claimants as well as Bankruptcy
Code section 503(b)(9) claimants.178 Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) claimants are those
creditors who have administrative expense priority for “the value of any goods received by the
debtor within 20 days before” petition date.179 The Court granted the Debtors’ motion.180
172

Id.

173

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

178

Id.
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11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(9).
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Motion to Authorize Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing
the Debtors to Pay Prepetition Claims of Lien Claimants, Import and Export Claimants, and
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VIII.

Confirming The Plan

On June 16, 2017, the Debtors filed their Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (the “Initial
Plan”). The Debtors also filed a disclosure statement for the Initial Plan (“Disclosure
Statement”), pursuant to section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, for the purpose of gaining
disclosure statement approval, which would allow them to solicit votes to accept or reject the
Initial Plan.182 There were a number of objections to the Disclosure Statement itself.
181

A. The Disclosure Statement
Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Debtors may not solicit
acceptance or rejection of the Plan without preparing a disclosure statement containing “adequate
information.”183 Adequate information is defined as “information of a kind, and in sufficient
detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the
condition of the debtor’s books and records. . . that would enable. . .a hypothetical. . .investor. . .
of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the Plan.”184
The Disclosure Statement also provided a list of the classes that were entitled to vote on
the Plan, and what each class would receive if the Plan was confirmed.185 Eligibility to vote on
the Plan depended on what type of interests or claims an investor held.186 The Debtors’
Disclosure Statement identified the following classes187:

503(b)(9) Claimants, (II) Confirming Administrative Expense Priority of Outstanding Orders,
and (III) Granting Related Relief, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 24.
181

Chapter 11 Plan Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of The Gymboree Corporation and
its Debtor Affiliates, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 140.
182

Disclosure Statement for the Joint Chapter Plan of Reorganization of the Gymboree
Corporation and its Debtor Affiliates, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 141.
183

11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).

184

Id.

185

Disclosure Statement for the Joint Chapter Plan of Reorganization of the Gymboree
Corporation and its Debtor Affiliates, supra note 170, at p. 6-7.
186

Id.

187
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Class

Claim/Interest

Status

Voting Rights

1

Other Secured Claims

Unimpaired

Presumed to Accept

2

Other Priority Claims

Unimpaired

Presumed to Accept

3

Term Loan Secured Claims

Impaired

Entitled to Vote

4

Critical Trade Claims

Unimpaired

Presumed to Accept

5

General Unsecured Claims

Impaired

Entitled to Vote188

6

Intercompany Claims

Unimpaired/Impaired

Not Entitled to Vote

7

Intercompany Interests

Unimpaired

Presumed to Accept

8

Interests in Gymboree

Impaired

Deemed to Reject

1. Unsecured Creditors Committee Objections
On June 22, 2017, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102, the United States Trustee appointed 7
creditors to serve on the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).189 The
Committee was comprised of Hansoll Textile, GGP L.P., PREIT Services LLC, Deutsche Bank
Trust Company Americas, Simon Property Group Inc., Hutchin Hill Capital Primary Fund Ltd,
and Li & Fung Centennial Pte Ltd. 190
After being appointed, the Committee quickly filed an objection to the Debtors’ motion
to approve the initial Disclosure Statement.191 The Committee’s first concern was that under the
188

In the Initial Disclosure Statement, the General Unsecured were not entitled to vote, but
instead, deemed to reject. The original Disclosure Statement provided that holders of General
Unsecured claims would not be entitled to any recovery.
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Plan, Class 5 General Creditors (including non-creditor vendors, landlord rejection damages, and
unsecured note holders aggregating an estimated $220 million) would not receive anything. 192
Additionally, the Committee was concerned with the inadequacy of the Disclosure Statement.
Specifically, the Disclosure Statement lacked “critical information concerning (a) the significant
value of potential estate cause of action and other unencumbered assets, (b) the basis for the
broad releases being granted under the Plan to current and former insiders, including the
Sponsor, former directors and officers, and third parties, (c) the perceived estimated value, if
any, being received in exchange for the releases discussed above, and (d) which creditor
constituency was to receive the benefit of that value under the Plan and how that complied with
the confirmation standards under the Bankruptcy Code.” 193
In response to these concerns, the Debtors agreed to include a section in the Disclosure
Statement that outlined the Committee’s position.194 It stated that the Committee was still
investigating the Debtors’ history and financial affairs, and provided a detailed list of the issues
that were of specific concern.195 Furthermore, the additional language stated that the Committee
provided no input in the Disclosure Statement, and it was, in fact, filed before the Committee’s
formation.196
2. Landlord Objections
Weingarten Realty Investors (“Weingarten”), owner of several shopping centers, filed a
limited objection to the motion to approve the Initial Plan and the Disclosure Statement.197
Specifically, Weingarten was concerned about the Debtors not providing adequate notice of the
Debtors’ decision to assume or reject any of the unexpired leases held between the two parties.198
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the disclosure statement hearing.
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Limited Objection of Weingarten Realty Investors to Debtors’ Disclosure Statement and
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At the time of this objection, the Debtors had three unexpired leases with Weingarten.199
However, the Debtors had previously identified one of the Weingarten locations on a Store
Closing List previously filed with the Court.200 Thus, Weingarten objected to the Plan and
Disclosure Statement, because both documents failed to specify an effective date in which the
Plan would be declared effective; and believe, the Debtors, pursuant to sections 365(d)(4) and
1123(b)(2), should have had to identify all of the leases that they planned to reject prior to the
Plan Confirmation.201 By doing so, Weingarten and other lessors would have had the
opportunity to participate in the confirmation process, instead of being left without an answer
until days after the Plan Confirmation.
Legacy Place Properties LLC, Market Street Retail South LLC, W/S/M Hingham
Properties LLC, BP PruCenter Acquisition LLC, Warwick Mall LLC, and OWRF Carmel LLC
(collectively, the “Landlords”) also filed a limited objection to the Debtors’ motion to approve
the Disclosure Statement for the Initial Plan.202 The Landlords and Debtors were both parties to
the following unexpired leases:203
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See Notice of Filing of Store Closing List regarding the Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim
and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Consulting Agreement, (II)
Approving Procedures for Store Closing Sales, and (III) Granting Related Relief, Case 17-32986,
Doc. No. 342, Exhibit A.
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Limited Objection of Weingarten Realty Investors to Debtors’ Disclosure Statement and
Solicitation Motion, supra note 185, at pp. 3-4.
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Limited Objection of Legacy Place Properties LLC, Market Street Retail South LLC, W/S/M
Hingham Properties LLC, BP Prucenter Acquisition LLC, Warwick Mall L.L.C. and OWRF
Carmel, LLC to Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order (I) Approving the Adequacy of the
Disclosure Statement (II) Approving the Solicitation and Notice PRocedures with Respect to
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Each of the leases listed above were real property leases located in shopping centers.204
The Crazy 8 store located in Legacy Place was included on the same store closing list as the
Weingarten lease.205 The Landlords, similar to Weingarten, objected to the timeline leading up to
the Plan Confirmation. Specifically, they asserted that the provisions violated the Bankruptcy
Code and were unduly burdensome to individuals holding unexpired leases.206 The Initial Plan
provided that all unexpired leases would be assumed or rejected on the date the Plan was to be
confirmed.207 The Bankruptcy Code, § 365(d)(4) provides that “an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed rejected...if the
[debtor] does not assume or reject...by the earlier of ...120 days after the date of the order for
relief or the date of the entry of an order confirming the Plan.”208 The Court, however, extended
the 120-day period set forth in the statute. Instead, the Debtors had until the earlier of January 8,
2018, or the date of entry of an order confirming a Plan.209
The timeline in the Initial Plan provided that the Plan Confirmation would take place
prior to the January 8th 120-day extension.210 As such, the Landlords objected to the Plan
204
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Confirmation motion and insisted that the Court require the Debtors to assume or reject before
the Plan Confirmation.211 Lastly, the Landlords objected to the cure claim procedures proposed
in the Initial Plan. The Initial Plan provided that the Debtors would file cure notices at least ten
days prior to the date set for the Plan confirmation. At that time, the Landlords were required to
object at least seven days prior to the date set for the Plan Confirmation. Thus, the Landlords
could have had as little as three days to object. The Landlords’ objected to this provision and
asked that the Landlords be entitled to a minimum of ten days after the cure notices were to be
filed to object. 212
ARC SWWMGPA001, LLC, and twenty-nine other landlords also filed a limited
objection to the Disclosure Statement in which they raised the same issues as the Landlords
(previously discussed above) in regards to the accept or reject deadline for executory leases
falling beyond the Effective Date of the Plan, and the short time period in which Landlords could
reject.213 In addition to these objections, however, the parties also objected to the Disclosure
Statement and Initial Plan for not providing any information on what adequate assurance
information the Debtors intended to provide the landlords, and a deadline by which landlords
could expect this information to be provided.214 Furthermore, the parties argued that the Initial
Plan improperly sought to modify rights under the leases.215 The parties asserted that the Debtors
could not avoid all of the obligations under the leases by included releases or waivers in the
Initial Plan.216 Lastly, the parties asserted that the Initial Plan deprived creditors of their setoff
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and recoupment rights. Under the Initial Plan, landlords would be deprived of their right to assert
setoffs or exercise recoupment.217
B. Disclosure Statement Hearing
On July 24, 2017, 6 weeks after filing, the Court held a hearing to confirm the Disclosure
Statement.218 Originally, the hearing was listed as a contested disclosure statement hearing.219
However, by the time the hearing arose, the Debtors had resolved all of the objections.220 The
Debtors provided the Court with a brief overview of how they got to the confirmation of
Disclosure Statement and how they planned to move forward. They began by discussing the
prepetition financing, DIP financing, exit facilities, and the extensive time and effort put into
negotiating with all of the parties involved in the proceeding.221 The Debtors then proceeded to
clarify that approval of the Disclosure Statement would not preclude any party from objecting at
confirmation with respect to any substantive issue relating to the Plan or with respect to any
future assumption, rejection, or assignment of a contract or lease.222
Furthermore, the Debtors continued to be in active discussions with the unsecured
creditors committee at the time of the hearing and remained hopeful that by the time they got to
confirmation they would be standing “arm-in-arm supporting [the] [P]lan.”223 Next, the Debtors
discussed the landlords. Changes were made in terms of the structure for which the assumptions,
assignment, and rejections of leases were teed up.224 Specifically, the Debtors agreed to file an
initial list of assumed, rejected, and assigned leases roughly two weeks before the confirmation
hearing.225 The Debtors also stated that they would provide adequate assurance information at
217
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that time, and the landlords would then have the ability to object.226 If the list was revised
following the objections, the landlords would have an additional opportunity to raise their
objections at the confirmation hearing.227
Lastly, the Debtors provided the Court with the reasons that they believed they met their
burden with respect to the Disclosure Statement. The Debtors assured that the Plan was in
compliance with Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the Disclosure Statement
provided adequate information. It contained information regarding the Debtors’ corporate
history, structure, and business overview.228 It discussed the events that led to the Chapter 11
filings, projections with respect to financial performance of the reorganized company as well as a
liquidation analysis, and risk factors related to the Debtors’ business.229 Furthermore, the
Disclosure Statement laid out the solicitation and voting procedures in detail, federal income tax
consequences of the Plan, and a recommendation to the creditors about voting to accept the
plan.230
After the Debtors provided their testimony, the Judge opened the floor to anyone who
wished to make a statement. Mark Indelicato, counsel for the Committee, addressed the Court,
detailing the concerns of the Committee.231 The Committee’s first concern was with regard to the
Debtors’ Rights Offering.232 The Committee had some concerns about the feasibility of being
able to raise $80 million and whether or not any lesser amount would be sufficient to get the
reorganized company through its first year.233 Furthermore, the Committee was not done with its
investigation and continued to look into the case with a pragmatic approach.234 The Committee
asserted that it would continue to work cooperatively with the Debtors in hopes of resolving any
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and all issues.235 To the extent that they could not resolve such issues, they would be prepared to
bring their objections to the confirmation hearing.236 With that, the Committee requested that the
Judge approve the Disclosure Statement.237
Next, the Court heard from Kent Kolbig on behalf of Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas, indenture trustee and member of the Committee.238 Mr. Kolbig reiterated his clients
support with what was previously stated by the Committee.239 Furthermore, he stated that his
client believed that more value should have been added to what would go to the unsecured
creditors, and unless the Debtors agreed to offer them more money they would bring that issue
up at the confirmation hearing.240
The Court then heard from Leslie Heilman, on behalf of a number of landlords.241 Ms.
Heilman was happy to confirm that the landlords had resolved their objections after active and
lengthy negotiations with the Debtors that related to the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement,
but more specifically, to the timing and the process that was proposed for the treatment of the
unexpired leases under the Plan.242 The Debtors negotiated various amendments to Section 5 of
the Plan as well as made additions to the Disclosure Statement’s order and schedules.243
After hearing the testimony of the Debtors and various parties, the Judge found that the
revised Disclosure Statement complied with the requirements of Section 1125 and Rule
3016(b).244 And for that reason, the Judge approved the Disclosure Statement.245
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C. The Confirmation Hearing
On September 7, 2017, just 88 days into the bankruptcy proceedings, the Court held a
hearing to confirm the amended Plan.246 At the hearing, the Debtors urged the Court to confirm
the Plan and presented a list of reasons why the Court should have confirmed the Plan. First, the
Debtors reminded the Court that 99% of the term loan lenders consented to the Restructuring
Agreement.247 Furthermore, the Debtors negotiated for months with a great majority of its
lenders, both secured and unsecured. By doing so, the Debtors anticipated more than one billion
dollars of debt reduction, “which [would] free the company to be able to operate outside of the
confines of interest burden and be able to reinvest in its operations, in its stores, and its
rationalized footprint.”248
The Debtors further reminded the Court that, under the proposed Plan, they would
convert almost all of their debt into equity; primarily through the term loan, which was
approximately 800 million dollars.249 The Term Loan Lenders agreed to provide new capital in
the form of the DIP financing and also sponsor a rights offering, which would result in nearly 61
million dollars.250 Additionally, the ABL lenders agreed to roll-up their facility into a postpetition facility, and that facility would be replaced with exit financing that the company would
utilize to operate its business in the ordinary course.251
Originally, the Debtors contemplated a 500,000 dollar distribution for the unsecured
creditors.252 However, as part of an ongoing negotiations that took place over several months, the
Debtors were able to make an arrangement that was supported by the Term Loan Lenders and
unsecured creditors committee and would result in a distribution of 4.5 million dollars to
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unsecured creditors.253 Thus, instead of receiving a pro rata share of 500,000 dollars, the Plan
provided that the unsecured creditors would receive a pro rata share of 4.5 million dollars.
The Debtors continued by enlightening the Court with statistics regarding the retail
industry and the small chances in which large companies like themselves successfully restructure
their business without having to liquidate. The Debtors noted that studies show that 55% of retail
cases end up in liquidations.254 And that was from a study period of 2006 to 2015, and it looked
at cases with more than 50 million dollars in liabilities.255 Furthermore, of the remaining cases
that were actually said to be organized, just 30% of those were sale processes that were
effectively disguised liquidations.256 Doing the math, only 15% of cases are actually able to
restructure on a stand-alone basis, like Gymboree.257
At the hearing, the Debtors further noted that although there were a lot of objections to
the Plan, all of those objections were resolved, except for the U.S. Trustee objection.258 The
Debtors assured the Court that “everybody that need[ed] to be around the table [had], in fact,
been around the table, and [they’ve] resolved any concerns that folks may have [had]….”259
Simply put, everyone with an interest in the case, with the exception of the U.S. Trustee, who did
not hold an economic interest, had consented to the Plan. According to the evidence presented to
the Court, the Plan was unanimously accepted by each class. In each of the voting classes, 99%
voted to confirm the Plan, in terms of amount, and 75% in terms of number.260 The final
tabulation of votes cast for the Plan by the parties entitled to vote is outlined in the chart
below.261
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1. Trustee Objections
Judy Robbins, the U.S. Trustee (“Trustee”) filed an objection to the Disclosure Statement
for the Initial Plan.262 The Trustee asserted that the Disclosure Statement failed to provide
creditors with “adequate” information; a violation of §1125 of the Bankruptcy Code.263
Specifically, the Disclosure Statement lacked adequate support for the proposed third party
releases264 and exculpation clauses265 described in the Initial Plan.266 The Disclosure Statement
disclosed that if the proposed Plan was confirmed, “pre- and post-petition lending group agents,
The United States Trustee’s Objection to Disclosure Statement for The Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization, Case 17-32986, Doc. No. 407.
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The third-party release, as provided in the disclosure statement, would release individuals
who are not parties in the bankruptcy proceeding to be released or discharged from any and all
causes of action that resulted from their interactions with the Debtors.
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The exculpation clause prevents the same parties that are beneficiaries will be free from
liability against anyone for various claims relating to the bankruptcy case.
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and its shareholder (Bain Capital Private Equity, L.P.), as well as all of those entities’ current and
former affiliates, subsidiaries. . .and pretty much anyone who has ever in any way connected
with any of those entities, [would be] released from any liability for anything they did with
respect to [the] Debtors.”267 The Disclosure Statement also disclosed that if the Plan was
confirmed, “the same parties that [were] the beneficiaries of the Third Party Release [would] be
free from liability against anyone in the world for various claims relating to these bankruptcy
cases, including many that were also redundantly included in the Third-Party Release.”268
The Trustee argued that consideration of whether third-party releases or exculpation
provisions were appropriate was dependent upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular case.269 Furthermore, third-party releases and exculpation clauses are not appropriate
in most cases, and their approval should be granted cautiously and infrequently.270 In order to
support the implementation of either clause, the Debtor must supply the Court with facts that
sufficiently support the appropriateness of the releases in the proceeding.271 The Trustee argued
that the Disclosure Statement did not provide enough “adequate information,” or factual or
evidentiary support for the proposed release and exculpation provisions.272
The Trustee also argued that the third-party release was not consensual, because the
Debtors had not afforded all of their creditors the ability to opt out of the third-party release.273
Furthermore, even if it was consensual, it was not justified. Rather, the Fourth Circuit has held
that consent is merely a factor that will be considered by the Court.274
The Debtors addressed this situation for the first time at the Confirmation Hearing. In
response to the Trustee’s objections, the Debtors argued that both clauses were necessary and
met all of the legal standards required by the Court.275 The Debtors asserted that the exculpations
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were narrowly tailored to meet the needs of the estate.276 Furthermore, it did not extend to actual
fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence, and it was limited to parties who provided
necessary and valuable duties in connection with the case.277
The Debtors’ response to the Trustee’s third-party release objection was more extensive
but tailored around the fact that the released parties made substantial contributions to the
Debtors’ reorganization. Furthermore, had the third-party release not been a part of the Plan, the
negotiations would not have went as well.278 The Debtors provided the Court with testimony
from James Mesterham, their Chief Restructuring Officer (“CRO”). He testified to each party
listed in the release contribution to the Debtors’ reorganization, and how necessary the clauses
were in negotiations.279 He testified that the releases were always part of what was required by
the various parties.280 Furthermore, the CRO testified that the purpose of the releases was to
provide closure and to avoid a host of competing litigations that could have resulted in lost time,
money, and substantially harmed the business.281
In regard to consent, the Debtors argued that every party that was being released
supported the Plan and wanted to see the company reorganized282. The parties casted their votes,
the Debtors reiterated, and the overwhelming majority agreed to the Plan, with the releases.283
The business would not have been where it was without all of the individuals listed in the
release, and in order to keep some of the relationships on-going postpetition, the Debtors were
sure these releases were necessary.284
2. The Judge’s Ruling
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After hearing testimony from numerous individuals, the Judge stated that the commentary
reflected that the third-party release and exculpatory clauses were essential to reaching a
resolution with all of the parties involved in the case.285 Furthermore, the Judge believed that it
was apparent “in this case that when you have a Plan that’s been presented and that reflects so
much work and effort on that part of all the parties involved in the case, that these types of
provisions are sometimes essential [and] necessary…” and in this case, met the legal
requirements.286 Not only did the Debtors comply with the notice requirements under Rule 2002,
but the Plan also met the requirements under Section 1129.287
The Judge also noted that the Plan reflected extensive and lengthy arms’ length
negotiations between the parties, and the only objection brought was from the U.S. Trustee, who
also supported the Plan with the exception of the third-party release and exculpatory clause. For
those reasons, the Judge did not hesitate in approving the confirmation of the Plan.

IX.

The Final Plan

On September 7, 2017, the United states Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia entered an order confirming the Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the
Gymboree Corporation and its Debtor Affiliates.288 Confirmation of the proposed Plan not only
bounded the Debtors, but any entity or person acquiring property under the Plan, any creditor of
or equity security holder in a debtor, and any other entities and persons to the extent ordered by
the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to the terms of the confirmed Plan, whether or not such entity or
person was impaired pursuant to the Plan, voted to accept the Plan, or received or retained any
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property under the Plan.289 The Plan stipulated 8 different classes of claims and outlined what
each class would receive on the Plan’s Effective Date.290

Furthermore, the confirmation order discharged the Debtors from any debt arising before
the Effective Date of the Plan and terminated all of the rights and interests of pre-bankruptcy
equity security holders and substituted the obligations set forth in the Plan for those prebankruptcy Claims and Interests.291
Under the Plan, claims and interests were divided into classes according to their relative
priority and other criteria. A creditor’s claim is impaired if the Plan “modifies the rights that the
class of creditors would otherwise have.”292 On the other hand, if the Plan did not modify the
class’s rights, or maintained the same rights that it would have received if the Debtors had not
filed for bankruptcy, the creditor’s claim was unimpaired.293 Pursuant to section 1126(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code, a class that is unimpaired is presumed to have accepted the Plan and
solicitation of acceptances by said class is not required.294 The distinction between the two is
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extremely important, because the impaired classes, unlike the unimpaired classes, have the right
to vote on the Plan.295
A. Class 1: Other Secured Claims
In the final Plan, the Debtors addressed Other Secured Claims first. Other Secured
Claims included any secured claim, other than (a) claims arising under the Debtors’ prepetition
asset-based lending credit facility of (b) a term loan secured claim.296 Under the Plan, this class
received payment in full in cash, delivery of the collateral securing any such claim and payment
of any interest required under § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, reinstatement of their claim, or
other treatment rendering such claim unimpaired.297 Because class 1 was unimpaired, it was
presumed to have accepted the Plan under section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.298 Thus,
holders of Class 1 claims were not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.299
B. Class 2: Other Priority Claims
Other Priority Claims included any Claim entitled to priority in right of payment under
section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, other than: (a) an Administrative Claim; or (b) a Priority
Tax Claim, to the extent such Claim had not already been paid during the Chapter 11 Cases.300
Claim holders in this class were entitled to receive payment in full in Cash or other treatment
rendering such Claim Unimpaired.301 Holders of Class 2 claims were also conclusively presumed
to have accepted the Plan under section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, and were not entitled to
vote to accept or reject the Plan.302
C. Class 3: Term Loan Secured Claims
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Holders of term loan secured claims received its Pro Rata share of: (a) the Term Loan
Common Shares; and (b) the Subscription Rights; provided, that the Li & Fung Term Loan
Claim was not entitled to any recovery under the Plan so long as the Li & Fung Agreement had
been assumed in connection with the Plan.303 The Term Loan Claims was allowed in the
aggregate amount of 698.7 million dollars, plus accrued but unpaid interest, fees and all other
amounts due under the Term Loan Credit Agreement; provided, for the avoidance of doubt, that
so long as the Li & Fung Agency Agreement had been assumed in connection with the Plan, the
Li & Fung Term Loan Claim was not Allowed and was deemed assigned to the Debtors and
canceled without further action or consideration to Li & Fung.304 Class 3 was Impaired, and thus
entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.305
D. Class 4: Critical Trade Claims
Critical Trade Claims included any claim held by a creditor that provided goods and
service necessary to the continued operation of the reorganized Debtors.306 Class 4 holders
received Cash in an amount equal to such Allowed Critical Trade Claim (only to the extent not
already satisfied by payments made pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court) on the later of:
(a) the Effective Date; or (b) the date due in the ordinary course of business in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the particular transaction or agreement giving rise to such allowed
Critical Trade Claim.307 Holders of Allowed Critical Trade Claims were conclusively presumed
to have accepted the Plan under section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus not entitled to
vote to accept or reject the Plan.308
E. General Unsecured Claims
General Unsecured Claim included any Claim, including the Term Loan Deficiency
Claim and the Unsecured Note Claim, other than (a) an Administrative Claim, (b) a Secured Tax
Claim, (c) an Other Secured Claim, (d) a Priority Tax Claim, (e) an Other Priority Claim, (f) a
Term Loan Secured Claim, (g) a Critical Trade Claim, (h) an Intercompany Claim, or (i) a DIP
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Claim.309 Under the Plan, holders of these claims were Impaired and entitled to vote on the Plan.
Upon confirmation of the Plan, class 5 holders would receive its Pro Rata share of the GUC
Distribution310 in one or more distributions.311
F. Class 6: Intercompany Claims
Intercompany Claims included any claim held by one of the Debtors against another
Debtor.312 Each claim was either reinstated or canceled and released at the option of the Debtors
in consultation with the Required Consenting Creditors; provided, that no distributions were
made on account of any such Intercompany Claims. 313Class 6 was either Unimpaired, and the
Holders of Intercompany Claims were conclusively presumed to have accepted the Plan under
section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, or Impaired, and the Holders of Allowed Class 6 Claims
were deemed to have rejected the Plan pursuant to section 1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. 314
Holders of Intercompany Claims were not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.315
G. Class 7: Intercompany Interests
“Intercompany Interest” meant, other than an Interest in Gymboree, an Interest in one
Debtor held by another Debtor or a Debtors’ Affiliate.316 In full and final satisfaction of each
Allowed Intercompany Interest, each Intercompany Interest was reinstated solely to maintain the
Debtors’ corporate structure.317 Class 7 was Unimpaired, and Holders of Intercompany Interests
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were conclusively presumed to have accepted the Plan under section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code.318
H. Class 8: Interests in Gymboree
“Interest” included any equity security (as defined in section 101(16) of the Bankruptcy
Code) in any Debtor.319 In full and final satisfaction of each Allowed Interest in Gymboree, each
Allowed Interest in Gymboree was canceled, released, and extinguished, and would be of no
further force or effect, and no Holder of Interests in Gymboree was entitled to any recovery or
distribution under the Plan on account of such Interests.320 Class 8 was Impaired. Holders of
Interests in Gymboree were deemed to have rejected the Plan pursuant to section 1126(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code and were not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.321
X.

Additional Provisions of the Plan

In addition to the treatment of different classes, the Plan also contained a few important
articles governing the reorganization of the Debtors’ business.
A. Substantial Debt-for-Equity Exchange
As discussed in Section VIII, the Plan was for Gymboree to emerge from these Chapter
11 cases with approximately one billion less funded debt. Gymboree’s pro forma exit capital
structure would consist of (a) a 225 million dollar Exit Revolving Facility, (b) a 48.5 million
dollar Exit ABL Term Loan Replacement Facility, (c) a 35 million dollar Exit Term Loan
Facility, and (d) the New Gymboree Common Shares.322
Specifically, the Plan contemplated the following restructuring transactions:323
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● The Debtors’ Prepetition ABL Facility was rolled up into the DIP ABL Facility, a
$273.5 million asset-based lending facility consisting of an up to $225 million
DIP Revolving Loan and an up to $48.5 million DIP Term Loan. 324 On the
Effective Date, the DIP ABL Revolver Lenders was (a) indefeasibly repaid in full
in cash or (b) if a DIP ABL Revolver Lender consents, such lender’s outstanding
DIP ABL Revolving Loan Claims and commitments under the DIP ABL Facility
converted into commitments under a replacement asset-based revolving loan
facility.325 Similarly, on the Effective Date, the DIP ABL Term Loan Lenders
were either (a) indefeasibly repaid in full in cash or (b) if a DIP ABL Term Loan
Lender consented, such lender’s outstanding DIP ABL Term Loan Claims and
commitments under the DIP ABL Facility converted into commitments under a
replacement asset-based term loan facility.326
● Certain of the Debtors’ Term Loan Lenders provided the Debtors with a DIP
Term Loan Facility of up to $105 million to finance these Chapter 11 Cases,
including up to $35 million of new money and $70 million of rolled up Term
Loans.327 On the Effective Date, the rolled up Term Loans was converted into
New Gymboree Common Shares equal to 41.0% of the New Gymboree Common
Shares outstanding on the Effective Date, subject to dilution by the Management
Incentive Plan and the DIP Surplus Conversion Shares after giving effect to the
increase in stipulated equity value as a result of the DIP Surplus Conversion (the
“Roll-Up DIP Conversion Shares”) and the new money loans converted into an
exit term loan facility provided by the DIP Term Loan Lenders or be repaid in full
in Cash.328
● The Term Loan Lenders (on account of their Term Loan Secured Claims)
received their Pro Rata share of 100% of the New Gymboree Common Shares,
reduced by: (a) the Rights Offerings Shares; (b) the Roll-Up DIP Conversion
Shares; (c); the Backstop Commitment Premium Shares; and (d) any DIP Surplus
Conversion Shares (if any) (the remaining shares, the “Term Loan Common
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Shares”), which was subject to further dilution by the Management Incentive
Plan.329
● Holders of Critical Trade Claims necessary to the business Plan of the
Reorganized Debtors was paid in full in Cash.330
● If Class 5 voted to accept the Plan, then Holders of General Unsecured Claims
received their Pro Rata share of $4.5 million; or if Class 5 voted to reject the Plan,
then Holders of General Unsecured Claims was not entitled to any recovery on
account of such Claims.331
● All Interests in Gymboree were extinguished.332
This debt/equity swap is not uncommon in Chapter 11 reorganization cases, as it is
simply a refinancing deal in which debtors, such as Gymboree, gains equity in exchange for the
cancellation of their debt.333
B. Rights Offerings
Another key term of the Plan was that the Consenting Creditors would fund up to 80
million dollars in two fully backstopped new money Rights Offerings in connection with the
restructuring transactions pursuant to the Backstop Commitment Agreement,334 dated as of June
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Commitment Agreement, solely in their capacities as such, including their respective permitted
transferees, successors and assigns, all in accordance with the Backstop Commitment
Agreement.
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11, 2017.335 On June 16, 2017, the Debtors filed a motion to assume the Backstop Commitment
Agreement. The Court granted the motion.336
C. New Gymboree Common Shares
The Plan provided that all of the existing interests in Gymboree would be cancelled as of
the Effective Date of the Plan; and reorganized Gymboree would have one class of common
equity interests, the New Gymboree Common Shares.337 According to the Plan, the reorganized
Debtors would issue the New Gymboree Common Shares to fund distributions to certain Holders
of Allowed Claims in accordance with Article III of the Plan on the Effective Date.338
D. Management Incentive Plan
The Plan also provided that the reorganized Gymboree board would be authorized to
implement a Management Incentive Plan.339 The Management Incentive Plan authorized the
issuance of options and/or equity-based compensation to certain members of management of
reorganized Gymboree.340 Furthermore, new Gymboree common shares representing up to 10%
of the New Gymboree Common Shares outstanding as of the Effective Date on a fully-diluted
basis was to be reserved for issuance in connection with the Management Incentive Plan.341
E. Exit Facilities
The Plan provided that the Debtors, on the Effective Date, would enter into the Exit
ABL Revolving Facility, the Exit ABL Term Loan Replacement Facility, and the Exit Term
Loan Facility.342 Confirmation of the Plan deemed approval of the Exit Facilities and the Exit
335
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Facility Documents, all transactions contemplated thereby, all actions to be taken, undertakings
to be made, and obligations to be incurred by the Debtors, including the payment of all fees,
indemnities, and expenses provided for in the Plan, and authorization of the Debtors to enter into
and execute the Exit Facility Documents and such other documents required to effectuate the
Exit Facilities.343
F. Li & Fung Agency Agreement
The Li & Fung Agreement provided that on the Effective Date the Debtors would assume
the Li & Fung Agency Agreement and, thereupon, the Li & Fung Letter of Credit and the Li &
Fung Term Loan Claim would be deemed assigned to Reorganized Gymboree and canceled
without further action or consideration to Li & Fung.344
G. Releases
The Plan contained certain releases, including mutual releases between (a) the Debtors and
Reorganized Debtors; (b) the Consenting Creditors; (c) the Sponsor; (d) the Commitment Parties;
(e) the Term Loan Agent; (f) the DIP Term Loan Lenders; (g) the DIP Term Loan Agent; (h) the
ABL Agents; (i) the ABL Lenders; (j) the DIP ABL Lenders; (k) the DIP ABL Agents; (l) with
respect to each of the foregoing entities in clauses (a) through (k), each such Entity’s current and
former predecessors, successors, Affiliates (regardless of whether such interests are held directly
or indirectly), subsidiaries, direct and indirect equity holders, funds, portfolio companies,
management companies; and (m) with respect to each of the foregoing Entities in clauses (a)
through (l), each of their respective current and former directors, officers, members, employees,
partners, managers, independent contractors, agents, representatives, principals, professionals,
consultants, financial advisors, attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, and other
professional advisors (with respect to clause (l), each solely in their capacity as such).345
The Plan also provided that all Holders of Claims that (i) vote to accept or are deemed to
accept the Plan or (ii) are in voting Classes who abstain from voting on the Plan and do not
object to the releases will be deemed to have expressly, unconditionally, generally, individually,
and collectively released and discharged all Claims and Causes of Action against the Debtors and
the Released Parties.346
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XI.

Conclusion

At the Petition Date, Gymboree operated approximately 1,300 stores. By the end of the
bankruptcy proceeding, there were only approximately 936 stores still standing. Therefore, there
was a total reduction of about 350 stores. Because of this successful proceeding, Gymboree was
able to stabilize relationships with vendors, use store closings to liquidate excess inventory held
by the company, uphold thousands of employee’s contracts, and continue its large retail presence
with landlords. Since the Effective Date, Gymboree has been able to keep the doors open to over
900 stores around the country, keeping its customers and vendors around the world happy. It
seems fair to say that each of the classes came out better under the Plan than in a liquidation
scenario.
Unlike other retail companies that have undergone reconstruction, Gymboree took a
proactive approach to be different. And it seems that that proactive approach was incredibly
successful and is evidenced in its continued business months after the bankruptcy proceeding. As
outlined by this paper, pre-bankruptcy negotiations were essential in ensuring a speedy and
successful reorganization process.
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